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1 Introduction
Traffic congestion is a severe problem in metropolitan areas around the world. A resident in Los
Angeles is estimated to lose around $6,000 per year due to spending extra hours in traffic (Economist
2014). This does not account for extra carbon emissions. A couple of ways to relieve congestion
are pricing (Vickrey, 1965) and carpooling, and online platforms and other technological advances
are now available to assist with these tasks (Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2018).1
Online platforms now offer the option to share rides. An immediate benefit is that passengers
who share rides pay a lower price for the trip. However, the passenger may also experience a
disutility from additional waiting, detours, and less privacy. Facing these trade-offs, ride-sharing
platforms and carpooling applications seek to increase the volume of ride-sharing, which will in
turn help in reducing congestion.
In this paper, we present and study a graph-theoretic matching problem that captures the
following three key features faced by ride-sharing platforms. First is spatial; the farther away two
passengers are from each other, the higher the disutility from being matched. Second is temporal;
passengers cannot match passengers who request rides at very different times. Third, the platform
faces uncertainty about future demand.
Contributions
Next we describe our basic graph-theoretic model and contributions. Time is discrete and one vertex
of a given graph arrives at each time period. Every edge has a non-negative weight, representing
the reward from matching these two vertices. A vertex cannot match more than d periods after its
arrival; after d units of time the vertex becomes critical and departs. It is helpful to think of d as
a service quality set by the platform and a passenger is assigned to a single ride after waiting for d
periods of time.
The goal is to find a weighted matching with a large total weight in an online manner. This
means that the decision for every vertex has to be made no later than d periods after its arrival
(this differs from the classic online bipartite matching literature, in which d = 0). There is no a
priori information about weights or arrival times and the underlying graph may be arbitrary and
hence non-bipartite.
Our first results are given in a setting, in which the vertices arrive in an adversarial order. We
introduce for this setting a 1/4-competitive algorithm, termed Postponed Greedy (PG). We further
show that no algorithm achieves a competitive ratio that is higher than 1/2.
The key idea behind PG is to look at a virtual bipartite graph, in which each vertex is duplicated
into a “buyer” and a “seller” copy. We enforce that the seller copy does not match before the vertex
becomes critical. This enables us to postpone the matching decision until we have more information
about the graph structure and the likely matchings. We then proceed in a manner similar to
Feldman et al. (2009a): tentatively match each new buyer copy to the seller that maximizes its
margin, i.e., the difference between edge weight, and the value of the seller’s current match.
We extend the model to the case where the departure of vertices are determined stochastically.
We show that when the departure distribution is memoryless and realized departure times are
revealed to the algorithm just as becoming critical, one can adapt the PG algorithm to achieve a
1Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2018) discusses the complementarities between autonomous vehicles, carpooling and
pricing.
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competitive ratio of 1/8. It is worth noting that when departure times are chosen in an adversarial
manner no algorithm can achieve a constant competitive ratio.
Next we study the setting in which vertices arrive in a random order. We analyze a batching
algorithm which, every d+ 1 time steps, computes a maximum weighted matching among the last
d + 1 arrivals. Vertices that are left unmatched are discarded forever. We show that when the
number of vertices is sufficiently large, batching is 0.279-competitive.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we show that the competitive ratio is bounded by
the solution to a graph covering problem. Second, we show how a solution for small graphs can be
extended to covers for larger graphs. Finally, we establish a reduction that allows us to consider
only a finite set of values for d. We conclude with a computer-aided argument for graphs in the
finite family.
Related literature
There is a growing literature related to ride-sharing. Santi et al. (2014) finds that about 80%
of rides in Manhattan could be shared by two passengers. Many studies focus on rebalancing or
dispatching problems without pooling, e.g., Pavone et al. (2012); Zhang and Pavone (2014); Santi
et al. (2014); Spieser et al. (2016); Banerjee et al. (2018). Alonso-Mora et al. (2017) studies real-
time high-capacity ride-sharing. It does not consider, however, a graph-theoretic online formulation
for matching rides.
This paper is closely related to the online matching literature. In the classic problem, introduced
in Karp et al. (1990), the graph is bipartite with vertices on one side waiting, while others are
arriving sequentially and have to be matched immediately upon arrival. This work has numerous
extensions, for example to stochastic arrivals and in the adwords context Mehta et al. (2007); Goel
and Mehta (2008); Feldman et al. (2009b); Manshadi et al. (2011); Jaillet and Lu (2013). See Mehta
(2013) for a detailed survey. Our contributes to this literature in three ways. First, we provide
algorithms that perform well on edge-weighted graphs. Second, our graph can be non-bipartite,
which is the case in ride-sharing and kidney exchange. Third, all vertices can arrive over time and
may remain for some given time until they are matched. Closely related is Huang et al. (2018),
which studies a similar model to ours in the non-weighted case, but allow departure times to be
adversarial.
Several papers consider the problem of dynamic matching in the edge-weighted case. Feldman
et al. (2009a) find that in the classic online bipartite setting, no algorithm achieves a constant
approximation. They introduce a free disposal assumption, which allows to discard a matched
vertex in favor of a new arriving vertex. They find, based on an algorithm by Lehmann et al. (2006),
that a greedy algorithm that matches a vertex to the highest marginal vertex, is 0.5-competitive.
We build on this result for a special classes of bipartite graphs. In the adversarial setting Emek
et al. (2016); Ashlagi et al. (2017a) study the problem of minimizing the sum of distances between
matched vertices and the sum of their waiting times. In their model no vertex leaves unmatched
and our model does not account for vertices’ waiting times. Few papers consider the stochastic
environment (Baccara et al., 2015; Ozkan and Ward, 2016; Hu and Zhou, 2016). These papers find
that some waiting before matching is beneficial for improving efficiency.
Related to our work are some papers on job or packet scheduling. Jobs arrive over online to a
buffer, and reveal upon arrival the deadline by which they need to be scheduled. The algorithm
can schedule at most one job per time and the value of scheduling a job is independent from the
time slot. Constant approximation algorithms are given by Chin et al. (2006) and Li et al. (2005).
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Finally, there is a growing literature that focuses on dynamic matching motivated from kidney
exchange (U¨nver, 2010; Anderson et al., 2015; Dickerson et al., 2013; Ashlagi et al., 2017b). These
papers focus mostly on random graphs with no weights. Closer to our paper is Akbarpour et al.
(2017), which finds that in a sparse random graph, knowledge about the departure time of a vertex
is beneficial and matching a vertex only when it becomes critical performs well. Our work differs
from these papers in two ways: we consider the edge-weighted case, and, we make no assumption
on the graph structure.
2 Model
Consider a weighted graph G with n vertices indexed by i = 1, . . . n. Vertices arrive sequentially
over n periods and let σ(i) denote the arrival time of vertex i. Let vij ≥ 0 denote the weight on
the undirected edge (i, j) between vertices i and j.
For vertices i and j with σ(i) < σ(j), the weight vij on the edge between i and j is observed
only after vertex j has arrived.
For d ≥ 1, the online graph with deadline d, denoted by Gd,σ, has the same vertices as G,
and the edge between i and j in G exists if an only if |σ(i) − σ(j)| ≤ d. We say that i becomes
critical at period σ(i) + d, at which time the online algorithm needs to either match it and collect
the associated edge weight, or let it depart from the graph.
We will consider two settings regarding how arrivals are generated. In the Adversarial Order
(AO) setting, we assume that σ(i) = i. In the Random Order (RO) setting, we assume that σ is
sampled uniformly at random among all possible permutations Sn of [1, n].
The goal is to find an online algorithm that generates a matching with high total weight. More
precisely, we seek to design a randomized online algorithm that obtains in expectation a high
fraction of the expected maximum-weight of a matching over Gd,σ.
To illustrate a natural tradeoff, consider the example in Figure 1 for d = 1. At period 2 the
planner can either match vertices 1 and 2 or let vertex 1 remain unmatched. This simple example
shows that no deterministic algorithm can obtain a constant competitive ratio. Furthermore, no
algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio higher than 1/2.
1 2 3
v1,2 = 1 v2,3 = y
Figure 1: Let d = 1. Therefore, there is no edge between vertices 1 and 3. The algorithm needs to
decide whether to match 1 with 2 and collect v1,2 without knowing y.
3 Adversarial arrival order
The example in Figure 1 illustrates a necessary condition for the algorithm to achieve a constant
competitive ratio: with some probability, vertex 2 needs to forgo the match with vertex 1. We
ensure this property by assigning every vertex to be either a seller or a buyer. We then prevent
sellers from matching before they become critical, while we allow buyers to be matched at any time.
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It will be useful to first study a special case, in which the underlying graph G is bipartite, with
sellers on one side and buyers and in the online graph a buyer and a seller cannot match if the
buyer arrives before the seller. For such online graphs we show that a greedy algorithm given by
Feldman et al. (2009a) is 0.5-competitive. We then build on this algorithm to design a randomized
1/4-competitive algorithm for arbitrary graphs.
3.1 Bipartite constrained online graphs
Let G be a bipartite graph and σ be the order of arrivals. The online graph Gd,σ is called con-
strained bipartite if for every seller s and every buyer b, there is no edge between s and b if
σ(b) < σ(s), i.e. b and s cannot match if b arrives before s.
Consider the following greedy algorithm, which attempts to match buyers in their arriving
order. An arriving buyer b is matched to the seller with the highest marginal value if the marginal
value is positive. If the seller is already matched to another buyer b′, b′ becomes unmatched and
never gets matched again. Formally:
Algorithm 1 Greedy algorithm (Feldman et al., 2009a)
• Input: constrained bipartite graph, Gd,σ.
• For each arrival i = 1, . . . , n:
– If i is a seller, initialize p(i) = 0, and m(s) = ∅.
– If i is a buyer:
∗ Set s ∈ argmaxs′∈S{vis′ − p(s′)}.
∗ If vis − p(s) > 0, set m(s) = i and set p(s) = vis.
• When a seller s becomes critical: match it to b = m(s) if m(s) 6= ∅.
Proposition 3.1 (Feldman et al. (2009a)). The greedy algorithm is 0.5-competitive for online
bipartite constrained graphs.
Feldman et al. (2009a) prove that this algorithm is 0.5-competitive for an online matching
problem with free disposal. In their setting all seller exists and buyer arrive one at a time. The
algorithm provides the same guarantees for constrained bipartite graph since, by construction, there
is no harm in assuming that all sellers exist rather than arriving over time. The key behind the
proof is that the value p(s) function for each seller s is submodular. In fact the result is a special
case of a result by Lehmann et al. (2006), who study combinatorial auctions with submodular
valuations.
3.2 Arbitrary graphs
In this section we extend the greedy algorithm for constrained bipartite graphs to arbitrary graphs.
A naive way to generate a online constrained bipartite graph from an arbitrary one is to randomly
assign each vertex to be either a seller or a buyer, independently and with probability 1/2. Then
only keep the edges between each buyer and all the sellers who arrived before her. Formally:
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Algorithm 2 Naive Greedy
• Input: an online graph with deadline d, Gd,σ.
• For each vertex t = 1, . . . , n:
Toss a fair coin to decide whether i is a seller or a buyer. Construct the online constrained
bipartite graph G˜(d, σ) by keeping only the edges between each buyer and the sellers
who arrived before her.
• Run the Greedy algorithm on G˜(d, σ).
Corollary 3.2. The naive greedy algorithm is 1/8-competitive for arbitrary online graphs.
Observe that for vertices i, j with σ(i) < σ(j), edge (i, j) in the original graph remains in the
generated constrained bipartite graph with probability 1/4 (if i is a seller and j is a buyer). We
then use proposition 3.1 to prove that naive greedy is 1/8-competitive.
One source of inefficiency in the naive greedy algorithm is that the decision whether a vertex
becomes a seller or a buyer is done independently at random and without taking the graph structure
into consideration. We next introduce the Postponed Greedy algorithm that defers these decisions
as long as possible in order to construct the constrained bipartite graph more carefully.
When a vertex k arrives, we add two copies of k to a virtual graph: a seller sk and a buyer bk.
Let St and Bt be the set of sellers and buyers at arrival time t. On arrival, seller sk does not have
any edges, and buyer bk has edges towards any vertex sl ∈ Sk with value vl,k. Then we run the
greedy algorithm with the virtual graph as input. When a vertex k becomes critical, sk becomes
critical in the virtual graph, and we compute its matches generated by greedy.
Both sk and bk can be matched in this process. If we were to honor both matches, the outcome
would correspond to a 2-matching, in which each vertex has degree at most 2. Now observe that
because of the structure of the constrained bipartite graph, this 2-matching does not have any
cycles; it is just a collection of disjoint paths. We decompose each path into two disjoint matchings
and choose each matching with probability 1/2.
In order to do that, the algorithm must determine, for each original vertex k, whether the
virtual buyer bk or virtual seller sk will be used in the final matching. We say that k is a buyer or
seller depending on which copy is used. We say that vertex k is undetermined when the algorithm
has not yet determined which virtual vertex will be used. When an undetermined vertex becomes
critical, the algorithm flips a fair coin to decide whether to match according to the buyer or seller
copy. This decision is then propagated to the next vertex in the 2-matching: if k is a seller then
the next vertex will be a buyer and vice-versa. That ensures that assignments are correlated and
saves a factor 2 compared to uncorrelated assignments in the naive greedy algorithm.
Theorem 3.3. The postponed greedy (PG) algorithm is 1/4-competitive for arbitrary online graphs.
Proof. Fix a vertex k, and denote pf (sk) to be the final value of its virtual seller sk’s match. If
k’s status is a seller in step (2.c.i), then we collect pf (sk). Note that this happens with probability
exactly 1/2 for every k.
PG = E
[ ∑
k is a seller
pf (sk)
]
=
1
2
∑
k∈[1,T ]
pf (sk).
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Algorithm 3 Postponed Greedy (PG)
• Input: an online graph with deadline d, Gd,σ.
• Process events at time t in the following way:
1. Arrival of a vertex k:
(a) Set k’s status to be undetermined.
(b) Add a virtual seller: St ← St−1 ∪ {sk}, p(sk)← 0 and m(sk) = ∅.
(c) Add a virtual buyer: Bt ← Bt−1 ∪ {bk}.
(d) Find a virtual seller for the virtual seller: s = argmaxs′∈Stvs′,bk − p(s′).
(e) Match if marginal utility is positive: If vs,bk − p(s) > 0, then tentatively match bk
to s by setting m(s)← bk and p(s)← vs,bk .
2. Vertex k becomes critical:
(a) Proceed if no match found: If m(sk) = ∅, do nothing.
(b) match in the virtual graph: If m(sk) = bl. Set St ← St \ {sk}, and Bt ← Bt \ {bl}.
(c) If k’s status is undetermined, w.p 1/2 set it to be either seller or buyer.
i. If k is a seller: finalize the matching of k to l and collect the reward vk,l. Set
l’s status to be a buyer.
ii. If k is a buyer: Set l’s status to be a seller.
For a virtual buyer b arriving at time t, let q(b) = maxs∈St vsb−p(s) be the margin for b in step
(1.d). Note that every increase in a virtual seller’s price corresponds to a virtual buyer’s margin.
Using the notation S = ∪tSt and B = ∪tBt, this implies that
∑
s∈S p
f (s) =
∑
b∈B q(b).
The dual of the offline matching problem linear programs can be written as:
minimize
∑
k∈[1,T ]
λk
subject to vkl ≤ λk + λl ∀(k, l) s.t. |k − l| ≤ d
λk ≥ 0.
(Offline Dual)
Let i and j > i be two vertices with j − i ≤ d. When j arrives, we have q(bj) ≥ vij − p(si).
Together with the fact that p(s) increases over time, this implies that {pf (sk) + q(bk)}k∈[1,T ] is a
feasible solution to (Offline Dual).
We can conclude that OFF ≤∑k pf (sk) + q(bk) = 2∑k pf (sk) = 4PG.
3.3 Alternative algorithm for Greedy: Dynamic Deferred Acceptance
Observe that the greedy algorithm discards a buyer that becomes unmatched and therefore does
not attempt to rematch it. We introduce the Dynamic Deferred Acceptance (DDA) algorithm,
which takes as input a constrained bipartite graph and returns a matching (formally presented
below). The main idea is to maintain a tentative maximum-weight matching m at all times during
the run of the algorithm. This tentative matching is updated according to an auction mechanism:
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every seller s is associated with a price ps, which is initiated at zero upon arrival. Every buyer
b that that already arrived and yet to become critical is associated with a profit margin qb which
corresponds to the value of matching to their most preferred seller minus the price associated with
that seller. Every time a new buyer arrives, she bids on her most preferred seller at the current set
of prices. This triggers a bidding process that terminates when no unmatched buyer can profitably
bid on a seller.
A tentative match between a buyer and a seller is realized (and the buyer and seller leave)
only once the seller becomes critical, i.e., she has been present for d time periods and is about to
become critical. At that time, the seller and the buyer are considered matched and depart. This
ensures that sellers never get matched before they become critical. A buyer is discarded only if she
is unmatched and becomes critical.
At any point t throughout the algorithm, we maintain a set of sellers St, a set of buyers Bt, as
well as a matching m, a price ps for every seller s ∈ St, and a marginal profit qb for every buyer
b ∈ Bt.
Algorithm 4 Dynamic Deferred Acceptance
• Input: an online graph with deadline d, Gd,σ.
• Process each event in the following way:
1. Arrival of a seller s: Initialize ps ← 0 and m(s)← ∅.
2. Arrival of a buyer b: Start the following ascending auction.
Repeat
(a) Let qb ← maxs′∈St vs′,b − ps′ and s← argmaxs′∈Stvs′,b − ps′ .
(b) If qb > 0 then
i. ps ← ps + .
ii. m(s)← b (tentatively match s to b)
iii. Set b to ∅ if s was not matched before. Otherwise, let b be the previous match
of s.
Until qb ≤ 0 or b = ∅.
3. Departure of a seller s: If seller s becomes critical and m(s) 6= ∅, finalize the matching
of s and m(s) and collect the reward of vs,m(s).
The ascending auction phase in our algorithm is similar to the auction algorithm by Bertsekas
(1988). Prices (for overdemanded sellers) in this auction increase by  to ensure termination, and
optimality is proven through -complementary slackness conditions. For the simplicity of exposition
we presented the auction algorithm but for the analysis, we consider the limit → 0 and assume the
auction phase terminates with the maximum weight matching. Another way to update the matching
is through the Hungarian algorithm Kuhn (1955), where prices are increased simultaneously along
an alternating path that only uses edges for which the dual constraint is tight.
The auction phase is always initiated at the existing prices and profit margins. This, together
with the fact that the graph is bipartite, ensures that prices never decrease and and marginal
profits never increase throughout the algorithm. Furthermore, the prices and marginal profits of
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the sellers and buyers that are present in the “market” form an optimum dual for the matching
linear program (see Appendix A for more details).
In Appendix A, we show that DDA is 1/2-competitive on constrained bipartite graphs. We
note that in the case of arbitrary graphs, we can adapt the methodology of Postponed Greedy to
DDA to recover a factor 1/4.
Although the DDA provides the same theoretical guarantees as greedy, we present it here since
it may lead to better results in practice. Loosely speaking it rationalizes a reoptimization-like
algorithm by keeping a tentative maximum weighted matching.
3.4 Lower bounds
Claim 3.4. When the input is a constrained bipartite graph:
- No deterministic algorithm can obtain a competitive ratio above
√
5−1
2 ≈ 0.618.
- No randomized algorithm can obtain a competitive ratio above 45 .
1 2 3 4
1
(
√
5−1)/2
x = 1 or 0
1 2 3 4
1
1/2
x = 1 or 0
Figure 2: Bipartite graph where S = {1, 2} and B = {3, 4}, with d = 2: vertex 1 becomes critical
before 4 arrives. The adversary is allowed to choose edge (2, 4) to be either 1 or 0. Left: instance
for the deterministic case. Right: instance for the randomized case.
Proof. Deterministic algorithm: Consider the example on the left of Figure 2. When seller 1
becomes critical, the algorithm either matches her with buyer 3, or lets 1 departs unmatched. The
adversary then chooses x accordingly. Thus the competitive ratio cannot exceed:
max
(
min
x∈{0,1}
√
5−1
2 + x
max(
√
5−1
2 + x, 1)
, min
x∈{0,1}
1
max(
√
5−1
2 + x, 1)
)
=
√
5− 1
2
.
Randomized algorithm: Consider the example on the right of Figure 2. Similarly to the
deterministic case, when seller 1 becomes critical, the algorithm decides to match her with 3 with
probability p. The adversary then chooses x accordingly. Thus the competitive ratio cannot exceed:
max
p∈[0,1]
min
x∈{0,1}
p(1/2 + x) + (1− p)
max(1/2 + x, 1)
= 4/5.
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1 2 3 4
1
1− 
1
Figure 3: Bipartite graph where S = {1, 2} and B = {3, 4}, with d = 2: vertex 1 becomes critical
before 4 arrives. Dotted edges represent edges that are not know to the algorithm initially.
Next we show that our analysis for PG is tight.
Claim 3.5. There exists a constrained bipartite graph for which PG is 1/(4−2) -competitive.
Proof. Consider the input graph in Figure 3. Vertex 2 will be temporarily matched with 3, and
vertex 1 will depart unmatched. When 2 becomes critical, with probability 1/2, she will be deter-
mined to be a buyer and will depart unmatched. Therefore the PG collects in expectation 1/2 while
the offline algorithm collects 2− .
4 Random arrival order
In some cases, the vertices can be assumed to come from a distribution that is unknown to the
online algorithm. One way to model this is to assume that the adversary chooses the underlying
graph, but that the vertices arrive in random order.
4.1 The batching algorithm
The batching algorithm computes a maximum-weight matching every d+1 time steps. Every vertex
in the matching is then matched, and all other vertices in the batch are discarded.
Theorem 4.1. Batching is (0.279 +O(1/n))-competitive.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 works in three steps. In a first step, we reduce the analysis of the
competitive ratio of Batching to a graph covering problem. More precisely, we show that it is
enough to cover Cdn, the cycle with n vertices to the power d, with ensembles of cliques. Second,
we show how a cover for small n can be extended to any n at the cost of a small rounding error.
Finally, we establish a reduction that allows us to consider only a finite set of values for d. We
conclude with a computer-aided argument for graphs in the finite family.
Reducing to a graph theoretic problem
There is no harm in assuming that the underlying graph G is a complete. Recall that Sn is the set
of all permutations over integers 1, ..., n. For any deadline d and any arrival sequence σ ∈ Sn, we
define the path graph P dn(σ) with edge-weight vij = 1 if |σ(i)− σ(j)| ≤ d, and vij = 0 otherwise.2
2Note that P dn(σ) corresponds to the path (σ(1), σ(2)), (σ(2), σ(3)), ..., (σ(n− 1), σ(n)) taken to the power d.
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Note that every batch in the algorithm has d + 1 vertices except the last batch which may
have fewer vertices. Let bi(σ, d) be the batch of vertex i under permutation σ and batch size d+ 1:
bi(σ, d) is the unique integer such that (d+1)(bi−1) < σ(i) ≤ (d+1)bi. We define the batched graph
Bdn(σ) with edge-weight vij = 1 if i and j are in the same batch (i.e. bi(σ, d + 1) = bj(σ, d + 1)),
and vij = 0 otherwise.
3
For any n ≥ d ≥ 1, denote Cdn to be the n-cycle to the power d.
Definition 4.2 (Graph operations). For any two graphs H and H ′ with vertices 1, ..., n and re-
spective edge weights vij , v
′
ij, we define the following:
(i) The linear combination aH + bH ′ denotes the graph with edge weights avij + bv′ij,
(ii) The product H ∗H ′ denotes the graph with edge weights vij ∗ v′ij, and
(iii) We say that H is a cover of H ′ if for all i, j, vi,j ≥ v′ij.
For any graph H, let m(H) denote the value of a maximum-weight matching over H. Observe
that when the arrival sequence is σ, the graph P dn(σ) ∗ G = G(d, σ) and therefore the offline
algorithm collects m(P dn(σ) ∗G). Note that the online algorithm collects m(Bdn(σ) ∗G).
Remark 4.3. Observe that for any graphs H,H ′, G and any a, b ∈ R, we have:
- m(aH + bH ′) ≤ am(H) + bm(H ′).
- If H is a cover of H ′, then, m(H ∗G) ≥ m(H ′ ∗G).
Definition 4.4 (Periodic permutation). For p < n such that p divides n, we say that a permutation
σ ∈ Sn is p-periodic if for all i ∈ [1, n− p], σ(i+ p) ≡ σ(i) + p mod n.
We say that a permutation σ is periodic if there exists p such that σ is p-periodic.
Definition 4.5 ((α, d)-cover). Let F be an unweighted graph with n vertices. We say that a set
of permutations {σ1, ..., σK} ∈ Sn forms an (α, d)-cover of F if there exist values λ1, ..., λK ∈ [0, 1]
such that:
(i)
∑
k≤K λkB
d
n(σk) is a cover of F .
(ii)
∑
k≤K λk = α.
We say that an (α, d)-cover is p-periodic if for all k, σk is p-periodic.
The next proposition will allow us to abstract away from the weights that are chosen by the
adversary. For any graph H, we denote by Hij the weight vij in H.
Proposition 4.6. If there exists an (α, d)-cover of Cdn, then batching is 1/α-competitive.
Proof. Let id be the identity permutation over n vertices. Let {σ1, ..., σK} be an (α, d)-cover of Cdn.
Fix an arrival sequence σ ∈ Sn. We first claim that {σ1 ◦ σ, ..., σK ◦ σ} is an (α, d)-cover of P dn(σ).
For any σ ∈ Sn, let us denote βi,j(σ) and ρi,j(σ) to be the weights of edge (i, j) in Bdn(σ) and
P dn(σ) respectively. Consider (i, j) ∈ P dn(σ): |σ(i)− σ(j)| ≤ d:
3Note that Bdn(σ) is a collection of disjoint (d+ 1)-cliques.
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∑
k
λkβi,j(σk ◦ σ) =
∑
k
λkI[bi(σk ◦ σ, d) = bj(σk ◦ σ, d)]
=
∑
k
λkI[bσ(i)(σk, d) = bσ(j)(σk, d)]
≥ ρ(id)σ(i),σ(j) = 1,
where the last inequality is implied by the fact that {σ1, ..., σK} is an (α, d)-cover of Cdn and therefore
of P dn(id). Therefore the claim holds using remark 4.3.
Denote by BAT the value collected by the batching algorithm and OFF the value collected by
the offline algorithm. Observe that
OFF =
1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn
m(P dn(σ) ∗G)
≤ 1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn
∑
k
λkm(B
d
n(σk ◦ σ) ∗G)
=
1
n!
∑
k
λk
∑
σ′∈Sn
m(Bdn(σ
′) ∗G)
= αBAT,
where we used the change of variable σ′ = σk◦σ and the fact that the application Ak : σ 7→ σk◦σ
is a bijection.
We have reduced the analysis of Batching to a graph-theoretic problem without edge weights.
In what follows, we will show that we can reduce the problem further to find covers of Cdn for only
small values of n and d.
Reducing n: periodic covers.
We now wish to find (α, d)-covers for Cdn for every n and d. In Proposition 4.7, we show that it is
sufficient to find periodic covers for small values of n.
Proposition 4.7. Let p be a multiple of d+ 1, and n1 a multiple of p. Any p-periodic (α, d)-cover
of Cdn1 can be extended into an (α+O(
p/n), d)-cover of Cdn for any n ≥ n1.
Proof when n is a multiple of p. Let {σ1, ..., σK} be a p-periodic (α, d)-cover of Cdn1 . We will show
that it can be extended into an (α, d)-cover of Cdn.
Assume for now that n is a multiple of p. Let σ′k be the p-periodic permutation over 1, ..., n
such that for all i ∈ [1, p], σ′k(i) = σk(i). Take i′, j′ ∈ [1, n] such that |i′ − j′| ≤ d. Because n1 > p
is a multiple of p, there exist i, j ∈ [1, n1] such that i ≡ i′ mod p, j ≡ j′ mod p and |i − j| ≤ d.
By p-periodicity of σk and σ
′
k, we know that B
d
n(σ
′
k)i′,j′ = B
d
n1(σk)i,j . Thus we can conclude that
{σ′1, ..., σ′K} is an (α, d)-cover of Cdn.
In the case when n is not a multiple of p, the proof follows similar ideas and looses an additional
factor
(
n
n−p
)2
due to rounding of n to a lower multiple of p. Details are provided in Appendix B.
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Reducing d: cycle contraction.
In Proposition 4.7, we show that it is enough to find periodic (α, d)-covers of Cdn for small values
of n. Next, we provide a reduction that enables us to consider only a finite set of values for d.
The key idea of the reduction is that we can contract vertices of Cdn into n/u groups of u vertices.
The resulting graph also happens to be a cycle C
(d+1)/u
n/u . In Proposition 4.10, we provide a way to
expand an (α, u− 1)-cover on the contracted graph into an (α, d) cover on the original graph.
Definition 4.8 (Cycle contraction). For any n, d and an integer u which divides n, we define the
u-contraction fu(C
d
n) to be the graph with vertices ak = {uk + 1, ..., u(k + 1)} for k ∈ [0, n/u − 1],
and edges (ak, al) if and only if there exist i ∈ ak and j ∈ al with an edge (i, j) in Cdn.
Claim 4.9. For any d, if u > 1 divides d+ 1 and d+ 1 divides n, then fu(C
d
n) = C
(d+1)/u
n/u .
Proof. We first prove that C
(d+1)/u
n/u covers fk(C
d
n). Fix k, l ∈ [0, n/u− 1], and assume that k < l. If
|l − k| ≤ (d + 1)/u, then let i = u(k + 1) and j = ul + 1. We have |j − i| = u(l − k − 1) + 1 ≤ d,
thus (i, j) ∈ Cdn and (k, l) ∈ fu(Cdn).
Conversely, we now prove that fu(C
d
n) covers C
(d+1)/u
n/u . If there exist i ∈ ak and j ∈ al such
that |j − i| ≤ d, then u(l− k) ≤ ul+ 1− u(k + 1) ≤ d+ 1 which implies that (k, l) ∈ C(d+1)/un/u .
Figure 4: Left: C312, with contraction for u = 2. Right: Contracted graph f(C
3
12) = C
2
6 with
vertices a = {1, 2}, b = {3, 4}, ... f = {11, 12}.
Proposition 4.10. Fix d ≥ 1. For d+ 1 > k ≥ 1, suppose that there is a periodic (α, k − 1)-cover
of Ckrk.
(i) For any integer r, if k divides d+ 1 then there exists a periodic (α, d)-cover of Cdr(d+1).
(ii) In general, if v is the remainder of the euclidian division of d + 1 by k, then there exists a
periodic
(
α(1 + v/d+1−v)2, d
)
-cover of Cdr(d+1).
Proof of (i). Suppose that d+1 = ku and suppose that there exists p multiple of d+1 such that we
have a p-periodic (α, k− 1)-cover {σ1, ..., σK} of fu
(
Cdr(d+1)
)
= Ckrk. For any permutation σ ∈ Srk
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we can construct a permutation σ′ ∈ Sr(d+1) in the following way: if i ∈ at then σ′(i) = nkσ(t) + i.
Because Bkrk(σi) is a cover of B
d
r(d+1), we can conclude that σ
′
1, ..., σ
′
K is an (α, d)-cover of C
d
r(d+1).
The proof for case (ii) follows a similar idea, with an additional randomization that chooses a
subset d+ 1− v vertices that we can group in every group of d+ 1. The details are in Appendix B.
Final step: Computer-aided proof of factor 2.79
We will now apply Proposition 4.7 with p = 2(d + 1) and n1 = 4(d + 1). Let Ωd be the set of
2(d+ 1)-periodic permutations of 1, ..., 4(d+ 1). We can find covers for Cd4(d+1) using the following
linear program:
minimize
∑
σ∈Ωd
λσ
subject to
∑
σ∈Ωd
λσI[bi(σ, d) = bj(σ, d)] ≥ 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ Cd4(d+1)
λσ ∈ R+, σ ∈ Ωd
(LPd)
Proposition 4.11. Let αd be the solution to LPd. Let α = supd≥1 αd. Batching is (1/α+O(1/n))-
competitive.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 4.6 and 4.7.
The Linear program (LPd) has O(d!) variables, and solving it may not be computationally
possible when d is large. Using Proposition 4.10, we now provide a way to find upper bounds on
αd by solving a different LP on a smaller graph.
Recall that Ωk−1 is the set of 2k-periodic permutations of 1, ..., 4k. We define the problem of
finding an (α, k − 1)-cover of the cycle Ck4k.
minimize
∑
σ∈Ωk−1
λσ
subject to
∑
σ∈Ωk−1
λσI[bi(σ, k − 1) = bj(σ, k − 1)] ≥ 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ Ck4k
λσ ∈ R+, σ ∈ Ωk−1
(LP’k)
We denote by α′k the solution to (LP’k). Solving (LP’k) numerically for k = 4 yields α
′
4 ≤ 3.17.
For all d ≥ 52 Proposition 4.10 therefore implies that, αd ≤ 3.17 ∗
(
51
49
)2
= 3.58. 4 For d ≤ 50,
we either solve (LPd) directly, or use Proposition 4.10 to show that αd ≤ 3.58 (see Appendix C).
Observing that 2.79 ≤ 13.58 , this concludes the proof for Theorem 4.1.
4.2 Lower bound in random order.
Proposition 4.12. No algorithm is more than 12 -competitive even under the random arrival order.
4We note that our methodology can be extended to obtain a better factor. For instance, being able to solve (LPd)
for values higher than 50 would lead to a competitive ratio closer to 1
3
.
14
Proof. Consider a graph with three vertices {1, 2, 3} and d = 1, i.e. vertices can only be matched
to the ones arriving just before or after them. After the first two arrivals, the online algorithm
A needs to decide whether to match them or let the first arrival leave. Furthermore, it has no
information on how vσ(1),σ(2) compares to the other edge weights. Therefore the decision of whether
to match has to be a coin toss. Regardless of whether the algorithm matches the first two or the
last two arrivals, its expected reward is
v1,2+v2,3+v3,1
3 . OFF however has an expected reward of
max(v1,2,v2,3)+max(v2,3,v3,1)+max(v3,1,v1,2)
3 . Taking v1,2 = v2,3 → 0, we get A = 1/3 while OFF = 2/3
which concludes the proof.
5 Extensions
5.1 Stochastic departures in the adversarial order setting
We relax the assumption that all vertices depart after exactly d time steps.
We therefore focus on the stochastic case, in which the departure time di of vertex i is sampled
independently from a distribution D. We assume that the realizations di are only known at the
time i becomes critical.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that D satisfies the property that for
all i < j,
P[i+ di ≤ j + dj |i+ di ≥ j] ≥ α.
Then PG is α/4-competitive.
Proof. When a vertex k becomes critical in the original graph, we match it if its status is determined
to be seller. In that case, we need to ensure that its tentative match bl is still present. With
probability at least α, vertex l is still present, and we collect p(sk). The rest of the proof follows
similarly to that of Theorem 3.3
Corollary 5.2. PG is 1/8-competitive when D is memoryless.
5.2 Look-ahead under random arrival order
We assume now that the online algorithm knows vertices that will arrive in l time steps (and their
adjacent edges). We can update the Batching Algorithm in the following way: every d+ l+ 1 time
steps, compute a maximum-weight matching on both the current vertices and the next l arrivals.
Match vertices as they become critical according to the matching, and discard unmatched vertices.
Note that this is the same as running Batching when the deadline is d+ l.
Proposition 5.3. There exists an (d+l+1l+1 , d+ l)-cover of C
d
n.
Proof. For k ∈ [0, d+ l], let σk(i) = i+ k mod n. Let i, j be such that |i− j| ≤ d, then bi(σk, d) =
bj(σk, d) for at least l+ 1 different values of k. We can conclude that σ0, ..., σd+l is a (
d+l+1
l+1 , d+ l)-
cover by taking λ0 = ... = λd+l =
1
l+1 .
Corollary 5.4. Batching with l-lookahead is l+1d+l+1 -competitive when n is large.
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6 Conclusion
This paper introduces a model for dynamic matching in which all agents arrive and depart after
some deadline. Match values are heterogeneous and the underlying graph is non-bipartite. We
study online algorithms for two settings, where vertices arrive in an adversarial or random order.
In the adversarial arrival case, we introduce two new 1/4-competitive algorithms when depar-
tures are deterministic and known in advance. We also provide a 1/8-competitive algorithm when
departures are stochastic, i.i.d, memoryless, and known at the time a vertex becomes critical.
Finally we show that no online algorithm is more than 1/2-competitive.
In the random arrival case, we show that a batching algorithm is 0.279-competitive. We also
show that with knowledge of future arrivals, its performance guarantee increases towards 1.
Importantly, our model imposes restrictions on the departure process and requires the algorithm
to know when vertices become critical. Other than closing the gaps between the upper bound 1/2
and the achievable competitive ratios, we point out a just a few interesting directions for future
research. Our model imposes that matches retain the same value regardless of when they are
conducted. An interesting direction is to account for agents’ waiting times. A different intersting
objective is to achieve both a high total value and a large fraction of matched agents. Finally,
it is interesting to consider the stochastic setting with prior infromation over weights and future
arrivals.
References
Akbarpour, M., Li, S., and Oveis Gharan, S. (2017). Thickness and information in dynamic
matching markets.
Alonso-Mora, J., Samaranayake, S., Wallar, A., Frazzoli, E., and Rus, D. (2017). On-demand
high-capacity ride-sharing via dynamic trip-vehicle assignment. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA.
Anderson, R., Ashlagi, I., Gamarnik, D., and Kanoria, Y. (2015). A dynamic model of barter ex-
change. In Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms,
pages 1925–1933. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
Ashlagi, I., Azar, Y., Charikar, M., Chiplunkar, A., Geri, O., Kaplan, H., Makhijani, R., Wang,
Y., and Wattenhofer, R. (2017a). Min-cost bipartite perfect matching with delays. In LIPIcs-
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, volume 81. Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum
fuer Informatik.
Ashlagi, I., Burq, M., Jaillet, P., and Manshadi, V. (2017b). On matching and thickness in hetero-
geneous dynamic markets.
Baccara, M., Lee, S., and Yariv, L. (2015). Optimal dynamic matching. Working paper.
Banerjee, S., Kanoria, Y., and Qian, P. (2018). State dependent control of closed queueing net-
works. In Abstracts of the 2018 ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling
of Computer Systems, pages 2–4. ACM.
Bertsekas, D. P. (1988). The auction algorithm: A distributed relaxation method for the assignment
problem. Annals of operations research, 14(1):105–123.
16
Chin, F. Y., Chrobak, M., Fung, S. P., Jawor, W., Sgall, J., and Tichy`, T. (2006). Online competi-
tive algorithms for maximizing weighted throughput of unit jobs. Journal of Discrete Algorithms,
4(2):255–276.
Dickerson, J. P., Procaccia, A. D., and Sandholm, T. (2013). Failure-aware kidney exchange. In
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 323–340. ACM.
Emek, Y., Kutten, S., and Wattenhofer, R. (2016). Online matching: haste makes waste! In
Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 333–
344. ACM.
Feldman, J., Korula, N., Mirrokni, V., Muthukrishnan, S., and Pa´l, M. (2009a). Online ad assign-
ment with free disposal. In International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pages
374–385. Springer.
Feldman, J., Mehta, A., Mirrokni, V. S., and Muthukrishnan, S. (2009b). Online stochastic match-
ing: Beating 1-1/e. In Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (FOCS), pages 117–126.
Goel, G. and Mehta, A. (2008). Online budgeted matching in random input models with applica-
tions to adwords. In Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete
algorithms (SODA), pages 982–991.
Hu, M. and Zhou, Y. (2016). Dynamic type matching.
Huang, Z., Kang, N., Tang, Z. G., Wu, X., Zhang, Y., and Zhu, X. (2018). How to match when all
vertices arrive online. In Proceedings of the 50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory
of Computing, pages 17–29. ACM.
Jaillet, P. and Lu, X. (2013). Online stochastic matching: New algorithms with better bounds.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 39(3):624–646.
Karp, R. M., Vazirani, U. V., and Vazirani, V. V. (1990). An optimal algorithm for on-line bipartite
matching. In Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
(STOC), pages 352–358.
Kuhn, H. W. (1955). The hungarian method for the assignment problem. Naval Research Logistics
(NRL), 2(1-2):83–97.
Lehmann, B., Lehmann, D., and Nisan, N. (2006). Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal
utilities. Games and Economic Behavior, 55(2):270–296.
Li, F., Sethuraman, J., and Stein, C. (2005). An optimal online algorithm for packet scheduling with
agreeable deadlines. In Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete
algorithms, pages 801–802. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
Manshadi, V. H., Oveis-Gharan, S., and Saberi, A. (2011). Online stochastic matching: online
actions based on offline statistics. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 1285–1294.
17
Mehta, A. (2013). Online matching and ad allocation. Foundations and Trends R© in Theoretical
Computer Science, 8(4):265–368.
Mehta, A., Saberi, A., Vazirani, U., and Vazirani, V. (2007). Adwords and generalized online
matching. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 54(5):22.
Ostrovsky, M. and Schwarz, M. (2018). Carpooling and the economics of self-driving cars. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ozkan, E. and Ward, A. R. (2016). Dynamic matching for real-time ridesharing.
Pavone, M., Smith, S. L., Frazzoli, E., and Rus, D. (2012). Robotic load balancing for mobility-
ondemand systems. Int J Rob Res.
Santi, P., Resta, G., Szell, M., Sobolevsky, S., Strogatz, S. H., and Ratti, C. (2014). Quantifying
the benefits of vehicle pooling with shareability networks. In Proc Natl Acad Sci USA.
Spieser, K., Samaranayake, S., Gruel, W., and Frazzoli, E. (2016). Shared-vehicle mobility-
ondemand systems: A fleet operators guide to rebalancing empty vehicles. In Transportation
Research Board 95th Annual Meeting.
U¨nver, M. U. (2010). Dynamic Kidney Exchange. Review of Economic Studies, 77(1):372–414.
Vickrey, W. (1965). Pricing as a tool in coordination of local transportation. In Transportation
economics, pages 275–296. NBER.
Zhang, R. and Pavone, M. (2014). Control of robotic mobility-on-demand systems: a queueing-
theoretical perspective. In Proceedings of Robotics: Science and Systems Conference.
A Missing proofs for Dynamic Deferred Acceptance
Lemma A.1. Consider the DDA algorithm on a constrained bipartite graph.
1. Throughout the algorithm, prices corresponding the sellers never decrease and the profit mar-
gins of buyers never increase.
2. At the end of every ascending auction, prices of the sellers and the marginal profits of the
buyers form an optimal solution to the dual of the matching linear program associated with
buyers and sellers present at that particular time.
Maintaining a maximum-weight matching along with optimum dual variables does not guarantee
an efficient matching for the whole graph. The dual values are not always feasible for the offline
problem. Indeed, the profit margin of some buyer b may decrease after some seller departs the
market. This is because b may face increasing competition from new buyers, while the bidding
process excludes sellers that have already departed the market (whether matched or not).
Proposition A.2. DDA is 1/2-competitive for constrained bipartite graphs.
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Proof. The proof follows the primal-dual framework.
First, we observe that by complementary slackness, any seller s (buyer b) that departs un-
matched has a final price pfs = 0 (final profit margin q
f
b = 0). When a seller s is critical and
matches to b, we have vs,b = p
f
s +q
f
b . Therefore, DDA collects a reward of A =
∑
s∈S p
f
s +
∑
b∈B q
f
b .
Second, let us consider a buyer b and a seller s ∈ [b − d, b) who has arrived before b but not
more than d steps before. Because sellers do not finalize their matching before they are critical, we
know that s ∈ Sb. An ascending auction may be triggered at the time of b’s arrival, after which we
have: vs,b ≤ ps(b) + qb(b) ≤ pfs + qib, where the second inequality follows from the definition that
qb(b) = q
i
b and from the monotonicity of sellers’ prices (Lemma A.1). Thus, (p
f , qi) is a feasible
solution to the offline dual problem.
Finally, we observe that upon the arrival of a new buyer, the ascending auction does not change
the sum of prices and margins for vertices who were already present:
Claim A.3. Let b be a new buyer in the market, and let p, q be the prices and margins before b
arrived, and let St and Bt be the set of sellers and buyers present before b arrived. Let p
′, q′ be the
prices and margins at the end of the ascending auction phase (Step 2(a) in Algorithm 1). Then:∑
s∈St
ps +
∑
b∈Bt
qb =
∑
s∈St
p′s +
∑
b∈Bt
q′b. (1)
By applying this equality iteratively after each arrival, we can relate the initial margins qi to
the final margins qf and prices pf :
Claim A.4.
∑
s∈S p
f
s +
∑
b∈B q
f
b =
∑
b∈B q
i
b.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.1 given that the offline algorithm achieves at most:
O ≤
∑
s∈S
pfs +
∑
b∈B
qib ≤ 2A.
It remains to prove Claims A.3 and A.4.
Proof of Claim A.3. The proof of termination in Bertsekas (1988) relies on the introduction of a
minimum bid  in step 6 of the auction algorithm to ensure that the algorithm does not get stuck
in a cycle of bids of 0. In the limit where → 0, the algorithm ressembles the hungarian algorithm
Kuhn (1955). The idea is to search for an augmenting path along the edges for which the dual
constraint is tight. If such a path is found, the matching is augmented, otherwise we perform
simultaneous bid increases in way that ensures that prices p and margins q are still dual feasible.
We assume that we are given at time t an optimal matching m and optimal duals (p, q)
corresponding to the graph with vertices St, Bt. We assume that we added a new vertex b
∗ to
B′t = Bt ∪ {b∗}, and that we initialized qb∗ = maxs∈St vs,b∗ − ps
Initialize m′ = m, p′ = p, q′ = q. Note that primal and dual feasibility are satisfied. Therefore,
(m′, p′, q′) is optimal iff the following three complementary slackness condition are satisfied:
∀s ∈ St, vs,m(s) = p′s + q′m(s). (CS1)
∀s ∈ S′t,m(s) = ∅ =⇒ ps = 0. (CS2)
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∀b ∈ B′t,m(b) = ∅ =⇒ qb = 0. (CS3)
Note that (CS1) and (CS2) are already satisfied. If q′b∗ = 0 then (CS3) is also satisfied and we have
an optimal solution.
Suppose now that q′b∗ > 0. We will update (m
′, p′, q′) in a way that maintains primal and dual
feasibility, as well as (CS1) and (CS2).
Our objective is to find an augmenting path in the graph. First we will start by trying to find
an alternating path that starts on b and only uses edges for which the dual constraint is tight:
E = {(s, b)|s ∈ S′t, b ∈ B′t, vs,b = p′s + q′b}. Observe that by (CS1) all the matched edges in m are in
E . We will now successively color vertices as follows:
0. Start by coloring b∗ in blue.
1. For any blue buyer b, for any seller s such that (s, b) ∈ E and s 6= m(b), we color s in red.
2. For any red seller s, let b = m(s), then color b in blue.
Observe that there is an alternating path between b∗ and any red seller. If at one point we
color an unmatched seller s∗ in red, this means that we have found an augmenting path from b∗
to s∗ that only utilizes edges in E . In that case, we change m′ according to the augmenting path.
Because of the way we chose edges in E , (CS1) is still satisfied. (CS2) and (CS3) are now also
satisfied, which means we have an optimal solution (m′, p′, q′).
We terminate when we are unable to color vertices any further. In that case, let us define
δ1 = minb blue qb. If δ1 = 0, then there exists b ∈ B′t with qb = 0 and an alternating path form b∗ to
b. We update m′ according to that path, and verify that all CS conditions are now satisfied.
Suppose that δ1 > 0. Define
δ2 = min
b blue, s not red
{ps + qb − vs,b}. (2)
The fact that we cannot color any more vertices implies that δ2 > 0. Let δ = min(δ1, δ2) > 0.
For every red seller s, we update p′s ← p′s + δ. For every blue buyer b, we update q′b ← q′b − δ.
Observe that dual feasibility is still verified, as well as (CS1).
If δ = δ2, taking (s, b) the argmin in (2), we now have such that p
′
s+q
′
b−vs,b = 0 which means we
can add (s, b) to E and color s in red. We will eventually have δ = δ1, and this leads to qb = 0 and
we can terminate. This proves both the termination and correctness. Furthermore, monotonicity
of the dual variables is also straightforward. Let us now prove the conservation property:∑
s∈St
ps +
∑
b∈Bt
qb =
∑
s∈St
p′s +
∑
b∈B
q′b. (3)
Note that when we update the dual variables, then every seller we colored in red was matched in
S′ and we colored that match in blue. Therefore, apart from the initial vertex i, there are the same
number of red and blue vertices.
Proof of Claim A.4. The idea of the proof is to iteratively apply the result of Claim A.3 after any
new arrival. Let S˜t (resp. B˜t) be the set of sellers (buyers) who have departed, or already been
matched before time t. We show by induction over t ≤ T that:∑
s∈S˜t
pfs +
∑
b∈B˜t
qfb +
∑
s∈St
ps(t) +
∑
b∈Bt
qb(t) =
∑
b∈B˜t
qib +
∑
b∈Bt
qib. (4)
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This is obvious for t = 1. Suppose that it is true for t ∈ [1, T − 1]. Note that departures do not
affect (4). If the agent arrivint at t+ 1 is a seller, then for all other sellers s, ps(t+ 1) = ps(t) and
for all buyers b, qb(t + 1) = qb(t), thus (4), is clearly still satisfied. Suppose that vertex t + 1 is a
buyer. Using equation (1), we have:∑
s∈St+1
ps(t+ 1) +
∑
b∈Bt+1
qb(t+ 1) = qt+1(t+ 1) +
∑
b∈Bt
qb(t) +
∑
s∈St
ps(t) =
∑
b∈Bt+1
qib.
Note that at time T + d, every vertex has departed. Thus, S˜T+d = S, B˜T+d = B and ST+d =
BT+d = ∅. This enables us to conclude our induction and the proof for (4).
B Proofs for random arrival order
Proof of Proposition 4.7. When n is not a multiple of p, let v ∈ [1, p − 1] be the remainder of the
euclidian division of n by p, and u be such that n = pu + v. Let {σ1, ..., σK} be a p-periodic
(α, d)-cover of Cdn1 with associated weights {λ1, ..., λK}. We will show that it can be extended into
an (α (u/u−2) , d)-cover of Cdn.
We set σ˜k to be the p-periodic permutation over 1, ..., pu such that for all i ∈ [1, p], σ˜k(i) = σk(i).
Let x be an integer in the interval [1, u+ 1]. Define the permutation σ′k,x as follows:
σ′k,x(i) =

σ˜k(i) i ≤ px
i+ (u− x)p i ∈ [px+ 1, px+ 1 + v]
σ˜k(i− v) i > px+ 1 + v.
(5)
Take i′, j′ ∈ [1, px] ∪ [px + 1 + v, n] such that |i′ − j′| ≤ d. Because n1 > p is a multiple of p,
there exist i, j ∈ [1, n1] such that i ≡ i′ mod p, j ≡ j′ mod p and |i − j| ≤ d. By p-periodicity
of σk and σ
′
k, we know that edge (i
′, j′) is in Bdn(σ′k) iff (i, j) is in B
d
n1(σk). Thus we can conclude
that
∑
k λkB
d
n(σ
′
k,x) covers edge (i
′, j′) of Cdn.
Every edge is therefore covered for at least u−2 different values of x. Therefore,∑k∑x uu−2λkBdn(σ′k,x)
covers Cdn. This means that (σk,x)k,x is an (α (
u/u−2) , d)-cover of Cdn.
Proof of Proposition 4.10 in case (ii). Suppose now that d+ 1 = ku+ v with 1 ≤ v < k. We first
select vertices in the following way: select a subset Φ ⊂ [1, d+ 1] of d+ 1− v vertices uniformly at
random. Take ∆ = Φ + ku[1, r − 1] = {a+ kub|a ∈ Φ, b ∈ [1, r − 1]} and note that |∆| = kur.
We now contract vertices in ∆. This is the same as in Definition 4.8: for t ∈ [1, u], at is the set
of u smallest vertices of ∆ that are not in a1 ∪ ... ∪ at−1. Because d+ 1− v is a multiple of u, we
have ai+k = ai + (d+ 1). This implies that the contracted graph is C
(d+1)/u
n/u .
Similarly to the proof of case (i), we extend a cover for C
(d+1)/u
n/u to cover every edge (i, j)
for i, j ∈ ∆. If we sum over all the possible ways to select subset Φ, we note that every edge
(i, j) ∈ Cdr(d+1) is covered with probability at least
(
d+1−v
d+1
)2
.
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C Random arrival order: numerical values for small d
Solving (LPd) and (LP’k) can become computationally difficult given the increase in the number
of constraints, which is exponential in d. In Table 1, we show numerical values of solutions αd and
α′d for d between 2 and 13.
d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
αd 2 2.33 2.5 2.64 2.71 2.75 2.79 2.83 2.99
∗ 3.2∗ 3.11∗ 3.23∗
α′d 4 3.45 3.17 3.15 3.12 3.09 3.08 3.07 3.20
∗ 3.153∗ 3.264∗ 3.318∗
Table 1: Numerical values for αd and α
′
d for small values of d. Starred elements were solved
approximately (are therefore upper bounds on the actual value).
We now need to provide upper bounds for all d between 14 and 51. Note first that if d+ 1 is a
multiple of k, then Proposition 4.10 implies that αd ≤ α′k. Therefore, we need only consider prime
values for d. In table 2, we compute upper bounds for αd using Proposition 4.10. For each case,
we report which value of k we used, as well as the value α′k ((d+1−v)/(d+1))
2.
This allows us to conclude that Batching is 0.279-competitive.
d 17 19 23 29 31 37 41 43 47
αd ≤ 3.58 3.48 3.44 3.31 3.36 3.30 3.31 3.24 3.35
k used 4 6 11 7 5 6 5 7 9
Table 2: Upper bounds for αd for prime values of d; derived from Proposition 4.10 using the
following formula: αd ≤ αk
(
d+1−v
d+1
)2
for k ≤ d and v = d mod k .
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